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LONGING FOR LOVING
KatherineM. Franke*
Our task in this Symposium is to place Loving v. Virginia' in a
contemporary context: to interpret, if not reinterpret, its meaning in light of
the settings in which race, sexuality, and intimacy are being negotiated and
renegotiated today. So we might ask, in what way are Mildred and Richard
Loving role models for us today? How, if at all, does the legal movement
for marriage equality for interracial couples help us think through our
arguments and strategies as we struggle today for marriage equality for
same-sex couples?
One way to frame these questions is to ask whether there is a shared
etiology in the racial and sexual orientation contexts. That is to say, can or
should the contemporary struggle mirror the arc of justice in the racial
equality context fifty years ago? Does getting the justice project right today
mean that same-sex couples are entitled to our own Loving moment, and
that we are entitled to it soon? Surely that is the overwhelming view in the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender legal community.
But I will say here, as I have said elsewhere, that there are good reasons
to resist the analogy to Loving and to resist the pull of a Loving-like notion
of justice. As we push to create a less heteronormative society, we ought to
rely less on lawyers and more on politics, and in so doing, we may find
different analogies that inspire our political and legal strategies in the
present.
Having said that, we should be clear about where the decriminalization
accomplished in Lawrence v. Texas 2 has left us. Of course, we are not now
in a Loving moment, notwithstanding Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health.3 In fact, we are in a McLaughlin v. Florida4 moment-or
something kind of like it. McLaughlin was the U.S. Supreme Court's 1964
case that invalidated laws criminalizing interracial sex on equal protection
* Professor of Law, Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Culture and Director of
the Program in Gender and Sexuality Law, Columbia Law School. This paper benefited
enormously from conversations with Kate Bartlett, Liz Emens, Suzanne Goldberg, Janlori
Goldman, Janet Halley, Melanie Leslie, Sally Merry, Carol Sanger, Bob Scott, Buffie Scott,
and Anna Marie Smith, the participants at the Frontiers of Family Law conference at the
University of Utah, and faculty workshops at Columbia Law School and Northeastern Law
School, as well as from Sarah Hinger's excellent research assistance.
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
3. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
4. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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grounds.5 In a recent article, Ariela Dubler reminded us of the importance
and significance of McLaughlin,6 pointing out that McLaughlin has been
neglected in our collective memories of the Court's jurisprudence of racial
and sexual equality. It was not viewed as having its own significance, but
rather was regarded as an intermediate step toward the invalidation of laws
criminalizing or prohibiting interracial marriage. Loving was what the
stakes were all about, and McLaughlin was merely a pit stop along the way.
This understanding of McLaughlin is wrong, Dubler argues, because the
case was really about the legitimate bounds of regulation of nonmarital sex,
and we do it a disservice if we understand it as only having had
instrumental value as a stepping stone toward another goal: setting the
7
legitimate bounds of the regulation of marriage.
But Lawrence leaves us in a different place than did McLaughlin.
Indeed, Lawrence is not the gay McLaughlin. McLaughlin was an equal
protection case, and the Court's ruling expressly left intact the state's power
to punish sex outside of marriage. If a state chose to regulate nonmarital
sex it simply had to do so in a manner that did not differentiate on the basis
of race. In that sense, McLaughlin merely extended the force of a
preexisting nondiscrimination norm to one more site in which the state was
exercising otherwise legitimate police power. By contrast, Lawrence, as a
liberty case, explicitly limits the state's ability to punish nonmarital sex, and
in so doing recognizes new rights to sexuality outside marriage.
To my mind, it would be a terrible mistake legally and politically to read
Lawrence in such a way that turns it into a gay McLaughlin. That is what I
am afraid is happening when our advocates urge an analogy between sexual
equality today and racial equality in the Loving era. We have something
much better to work with today than they had fifty years ago, and we need
to take a breath, take in that difference, and let it inform our politics.
What I argue in this essay is that post-Lawrence efforts to secure
marriage equality for same-sex couples must be undertaken, at a minimum,
in a way that is compatible with efforts to dislodge marriage from its
normatively superior status as compared with other forms of human
attachment, commitment, and desire.
Resisting the normative and
epistemic frame that values nonmarital forms of life in direct proportion to
their similarity to marriage, we must unseat marriage as the measure of all
things. To this end, I suggest a thought experiment: substituting friendship
for marriage at the center of the social field in which human connection
takes place. No longer the sun around which all other relationships and
relations orbit, our investments in marriage and marriage's investments in
us are likely to yield in such a way that we can imagine making the

5. Id.
6. Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas:
Freedom and the Road to Marriage, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1165 (2006).
7. Id. at 1167-68.
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argument for same-sex couples' right to marry while also imagining and
cultivating different longings than that in Loving.
Before I move to the next step in the argument, I want to make something
perfectly clear: I support the invalidation of marriage laws that are limited
to different-sex couples. Said another way, I condemn the legitimacy and
legality of laws that prohibit same-sex couples from marrying on the same
terms as different-sex couples. Why? Not because I believe strongly in a
right to marry, but rather because the refusal to distribute this public benefit
and status to same-sex couples is motivated by and perpetuates both
heterosexism and homophobia. I will return to the significance of this
particular formulation of the reason for supporting marriage equality, but I
wanted to get this issue out of the way up front. My critique of today's
marriage movement and the uses of history that it makes does not mean that
I oppose the idea that same-sex couples should be able to marry. I hold a
kind of "knock yourselves out if that is what you want" view of the matter.
Just do not make all the rest of us sign up for that project.

The turn to Loving as the proper analogy through which to understand the
civil rights stakes today is one that comes at some cost. In a Loving-like
strategy, decriminalization finds its opposite in legalization. The legal
effect of the Lovings' victory in the Supreme Court was the validation of
their marriage. On June 11, 1967, the Lovings were criminals in the
Commonwealth of Virginia, but on June 12, 1967 (the day the Supreme
Court issued the decision in their favor), they were not. On June 11, 1967,
the Lovings were not legally married in the Commonwealth of Virginia, but
on June 12, 1967, they were. In this frame, when a court invalidates the
criminalization of a particular behavior, the logical consequence of the
court's action is to render the group subject to positive legal regulation. In
this circumstance, there is no social or legal daylight between being subject
to the regulation of criminal laws and being subject to the regulation of civil
laws. The effect of winning the constitutional challenge to a status-based
disadvantage of this kind is that the district attorney walks the file
containing your criminal case over to the clerk in the marriage license
office. You and your relationship never leave the building. But then, in
cases brought under a Loving-like paradigm, the civil rights plaintiff never
looks for the exit sign to get out from under the direct control of
government and governance. Being shown the door gets framed as a
setback for equality rather than as a viable, indeed progressive, remedy to a
constitutional violation.
Returning to the breath that I urge we all take before we rush into the
world of Loving, my aim is that we imagine the political possibilities of the
current moment more expansively. How is that? Well, in a sense, we, the
gay community, find ourselves and our sexualities in a unique spot of un- or
under-regulation by the state. No longer subject to criminal law after
Lawrence, and not yet subject to the governance of state marriage laws, we
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occupy a kind of gap in the regulatory reach of the state. It is a "kind of'
gap, to be sure, because we are beyond the day when we can think of social
locations that stand fully outside of law-whether in law's shadow,8 in
social fields constituted by Weberian legal orders that in complex ways
mimic state legal regulation, 9 in spaces constituted by a Foucauldian sense
of law's circulatory power,' 0 or in legally pluralistic domains
conceptualized by Sally Falk Moore's idea of "semi-autonomous social
fields." '
How might we understand the relative absence of regulation of homosexualities as an opportunity rather than as an injury? The challenge we
face is in crafting arguments that support the extension of marriage rights to
same-sex couples who want them, while not doing so at the price of
12
denigrating or shrinking an affective sexual liberty outside of marriage.
At present, the debate within the gay community has largely been framed as
between those who favor marriage rights and those who regard the marriage
equality movement as regressive, unenlightened, and far too traditional. I
happen to think we can argue that same-sex couples be allowed to marry,
while also offering strong critiques, not only of the institution of marriage,
but of those who wish to marry.
If not an injury, how best to characterize the nonmarital status of samesex sex so as to better appreciate what its penumbral location in law permits
rather than focusing entirely on what it is denied? Are there ways of
conceptualizing the gap such that it might both permit and germinate new
and broader forms of sexual liberty than those that lie in a regime that puts
all its eggs in the marriage basket? Marriage, as we all know, offers certain
rights and responsibilities to those who are willing to conform their sexual
and affective affiliations to its constrained demands: only two adults, not
married to anyone else, who pledge to be monogamous, are financially
interdependent in a particular way, and will be bound by a set of
nonnegotiable default rules when one or both parties seek to terminate the
marriage. Thus, the institution of marriage demands the surrender of a great
deal of the liberty rights acknowledged in Lawrence, rights that unmarried
people enjoy much more robustly. For those willing to surrender to the
regulatory demands of marriage, the payoff is great in terms of legal and
social entitlements, legitimacy, and validation.

8. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
9. See Max Weber, On Law in Economy and Society 18-19 (Edward Shils & Max
Rheinstein trans., 1954).
10. See Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings
1972-1977, at 98 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
11. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as
an AppropriateSubject of Study, 7 Law & Soc'y Rev. 719, 721 (1973).
12. Among legal scholars, Nancy Polikoff has done the best job of undertaking this hard
task. See generally Nancy D. Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All
Families Under the Law (2008).
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If the institution of marriage compromised only the sexual liberty of
those people who choose to marry, I would be less concerned about the
terms of the commitment it demands. But, of course, its influence extends
well beyond the boundary of its official territory. There exists a rich
literature, to which I have made only a marginal contribution, 13 that
explains how the legitimacy and respectability that law confers on marital
couples reinforces the illegitimacy and deviance of those whose sexual,
intimate, and affective commitments, if not merely contacts, lie in
nonmarital contexts. 14 But we can say more. The normative centrality and,
indeed, priority of the institution of marriage establishes the standard by
which all other forms of kinship, family, friendship, temporary alliance, and
love are both rendered legible and assigned value. In this, and in most
societies, marriage is the measure of all things. Thus, affective associations
that lie outside the formal paling of marriage are evaluated and understood
by virtue of their likeness to, or dissimilarity from, marriage. Thus, the
significance that motivates a term such as "significant other" finds its
source in marriage, and this term is meant to signify the simulacrum of
spouse, i.e., "Spouses and significant others are invited to the office holiday
party." In so doing, it crowds out the plausibility, in fact the legibility, of
alternative forms of significance and otherness that do not nod to the
normative primacy of the marital form.
This challenge is not something that surfaces for the first time in the
context of same-sex marriage. Its early, and perhaps most profound
articulation, is to be found in Antigone's fidelity to a kind of love and
loyalty that lay outside of and challenged the official notion of kinship
licensed by the state. In so doing, she risked social, legal, and ultimately
physical death by insisting on honoring
the demands of kinship that defied
15
the state's official law of the family.
The challenge of this moment is to conceptualize a legal strategy that
takes on the exclusivity of marriage by repudiating the homophobia that
underwrites the exclusion, while not ratifying the normative priority of
marriage. How can marriage equality be won, but not at the cost of the
liberty value Lawrence recognized? How do we demand access to the legal
institution of marriage while at the same time undertaking the project of
unsettling marriage as the institutional measure of all things? This is the
hard work that I think lies ahead of us. It requires us to think more and
differently about the domain of affective and sexual attachments and
encounters that occupy the outside of marriage. This is the domain of queer
culture.

13. See Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex MarriagePolitics, 15 Colum. J.
Gender & L. 236 (2006).
14. Chapter 3 of Michael Warner's The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and Ethics
of Queer Life (1999) offered one of the first of such arguments.
15. Judith Butler offers such a reading of Antigone. See Judith Butler, Antigone's Claim:
Kinship Between Life and Death (2000).
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The law and society, legal pluralism, and critical legal literatures offer
several analytics that might be useful in mapping the positive space of the
middle ground-the gap-between criminalization and marriage. This
literature may be helpful in protecting a domain of norm generation within
"counterpublics," to borrow a term from Michael Warner, 16 that do not owe
fealty to marriage. Too little of this important work has been looked to, to
my mind, in the theorizing of queer sexuality in the era of the same-sex
marriage movement.
An obvious place to turn is a legal system that recognizes pluralistic
sources of law, one that has rejected the idea that civil state law has a
monopoly on the regulation of marriage, family, and sexuality. South
Africa offers a salient example of a post-colonial context in which a modern
legal order explicitly incorporates a notion of legal pluralism into its
conception of governing law. The South African Constitution allows for
the recognition of both civil state-sanctioned marriage as well as "marriages
concluded under any tradition." 17 Notably, Albie Sachs, justice of the
South African Constitutional Court, relied on this language in the South
African Constitution in finding in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie that it
was unconstitutional to refuse same-sex couples access to civil marriage:
"The provision is manifestly designed to allow . . .for a degree of legal
pluralism under which particular consequences of such marriages would be
accepted as part of the law of the land."' 18 Thus, the legally pluralistic
nature of the South African Constitution meant that the society as a whole
committed to a broad and inclusive understanding of fundamental
institutions such as marriage, and the opponents of same-sex marriage,
therefore, could not invoke a narrow notion of tradition to limit marriage to
different-sex couples.19
The reasoning used in the Fourie case suggests that legal pluralism,
particularly in post-colonial contexts, might offer a fruitful avenue for those
who seek the expansion of sexual liberty through the vehicle of same-sex
marriage, rather than having the (intended or unintended) effect of
accomplishing its contraction.
Unfortunately, the scholarship in this area instructs some caution in
making this particular move. Early and robust anthropological studies of
colonial and post-colonial legal systems in Asia, Africa, and the Pacific
sought to understand how indigenous populations maintained social order in
the absence of, or as an alternative to, European law. Bronislaw
Malinowski's Crime and Custom in Savage Society20 represents one of the
earliest and most formative of these monographs. These approaches sought
to differentiate formal, positive law brought to the colonies by Europeans
from customary or informal law that the natives had developed on their
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Michael Warner, Publics and Counterpublics (2002).
S.Afr. Const. 1996 § 15(3)(a).
Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) at 108 (S. Aft.).
Id.
Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926).
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own, in order to study the civilizing potential of modem European law on
the savage natives. 2 1 Such orientalist 22 accounts promptly gave way to
more nuanced studies that acknowledged that customary law was not a relic
of some precolonial era, but rather was an epiphenomenon of the colonial
enterprise itself. As colonists developed dual legal systems with one set of
laws and courts for the Europeans and another for the natives, the law that
was applied in the native courts was a construct of the colonial projectenabling the better control and discipline of the natives in the service of
colonialism. 23 But, as noted by numerous scholars of sexuality and
colonialism, such as Frantz Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth24 and Black
Skin White Masks,25 Sally Engle Merry in Colonizing Hawai'i,26 Anne
McClintock in Imperial Leather,2 7 and Ann Stoler in Carnal Knowledge
and Imperial Power,28 in colonial settings human sexuality is a particularly
ripe domain for social control through the invention, manipulation, and
juridification of the concepts of customary, native, natural, savage, modem,
western, and civilized. As I have written elsewhere, "The epistemic
violence of rule... can be most effective when done through and by sex
and sexuality," manipulating native and colonial understandings of these
29
concepts in the service of both colonization and decolonization.
When understood in light of this literature, the "victory" in the Fourie
case in South Africa becomes all the more complex. Pluralistic legal
systems can draw from their multiplicity to expand or contract sexual
liberties depending upon the context. Respectable gay men and lesbians
were able to deploy post-colonial pluralism to their benefit in Fourie. But
South African sex workers were not able to do so in State v Jordan,30 when
they brought a constitutional challenge to a statute that criminalized
prostitution on the ground that it interfered with economic activity, violated
21. See generally Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 Law & Soc'y Rev. 889
(1991).
22. This is, of course, Edward Said's term. Edward W. Said, Orientalism (1978).
23. See generally Martin Chanock, Law, Custom, and Social Order: The Colonial
Experience in Malawi and Zambia (1985); M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism: An Introduction
to Colonial and Neo-colonial Laws (1975); Francis G. Snyder, Colonialism and Legal Form:
The Creation of "Customary Law" in Senegal, 19 J. Legal Pluralism 49 (1981).
24. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Constance Farrington trans., 1963).
25. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (Charles Lam Markmann trans., 1967).
26. Sally Engle Merry, Colonizing Hawai'i: The Cultural Power of Law (2000).
27. Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial
Contest (1995).
28. Ann Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in
Colonial Rule (2002); see also Paul Gilroy, "There Ain't No Black in the Union Jack": The
Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (1991); Diana Jeater, Marriage, Perversion, and Power:
The Construction of Moral Discourse in Southern Rhodesia, 1894-1930 (1993); Jock
McCulloch, Black Peril, White Virtue: Sexual Crime in Southern Rhodesia, 1902-1935
(2000); Luise White, The Comforts of Home: Prostitution in Colonial Nairobi (1990); Jean
Comaroff & John Comaroff, Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa, 13 Am.
Ethnologist 1 (1986).
29. Katherine Franke, Sexual Tensions of Post-Empire,33 Stud. L., Pol. & Soc'y 65, 83
(2004).
30. State v Jordan 2002 (11) BCLR 1117 (CC) (S. Aft.).
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the privacy and sexual equality rights of sex workers, and discriminated
Pluralistic
against sex workers as compared with their customers.
approaches to sexuality, public and private, were of no aid to the plaintiffs
in this case. Instead, the court deferred to the state's representation that the
criminalization of commercial sex was required to improve "the quality of
life in South Africa." 3' That there might be diverse accounts of what could
make up a life of quality was not considered by the court, which chose to
defer in this instance to the majoritarian values that lay behind the Sexual
Offences Act. In so doing, the court relied upon familiar liberal
market/nonmarket
public/private,
by
characterized
dichotomies
transactions, and kin/stranger to find that the sex workers had no
constitutional rights to dignity, freedom of the person, or privacy that they
argued were at stake in the case. "[T]he prostitute invites the public
generally to come and engage in unlawful conduct in private," 32 concluded
the court in finding against the plaintiffs. The colonial history of the
criminalization of prostitution in South Africa was not addressed by the
court, nor were tribal or customary law notions of private, public, market,
nonmarket, kin, or stranger. Thus, even under the new postapartheid South
African Constitution, notions of customary, native, traditional, and modem
are indeterminately put to work in particular legal disputes. Those that pose
little or no threat to the normative superiority of modem sexual citizenship,
middle-class gay and lesbian couples as opposed to sex workers, are able to
draw from the advantages of legal pluralism. While those whose conduct
poses a challenge to the notion that the sexual should lie in a domain of
private, nonmarket relations of the family can find no refuge in the
normative force to be found in the customary or tribal.
Given the pluralistic commitments of the South African constitutional
system, the courts now, as in the colonial period, continue to palliatively
invoke notions of fidelity to plural legal orders in ways that demonstrate the
state's modernity, welcome domesticated legal and social subjects, and
discipline the unruly. Thus, I am pessimistic about the utility that legal
pluralism scholarship can bring to the project of rescuing sexual liberty
from the vice of liberal same-sex marriage arguments.
Another strain of law and society scholarship holds out better hope of
understanding the gap between criminalization and marriage as something
we ought celebrate rather than lament for the potential it holds for
innovation, experimentation, and the expansion of sexual rights more
generally. I am not suggesting that we adopt the idea of a gap between law
on the books and law in action, which forms one of the central objects of
study by law and society scholars. 33 I have another kind of gap in mind.
31. Id. at 119.
32. Id. at 28.
33. This law and society gap can be crudely understood as the inherent inability of legal
rules to translate to all real world problems. The vast majority of cases are resolved outside
the courts and law, the language of law is inevitably subject to interpretation, and "violence"
is done to real life when it is translated into legal forms of action. See, e.g., Mark Galanter,
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Almost thirty years ago, Robert Mnookin and Lewis Komhauser introduced
to the empirical legal literature the notion of "bargaining in the shadow of
the law." 34 In their study of the bargaining tactics and patterns exhibited by
married couples who were divorcing, they offered an account of the role of
law in the dissolution of marriages that went beyond the four comers of
positive law, instead focusing on the bargaining that took place outside the
courtroom, where the parties undertook private ordering in law's shadow.
Rather than regard family law rules and procedures as determining the
terms of a divorce, Mnookin and Komhauser argued that those background
or default rules merely created bargaining chips or endowments that were
used by each party in their efforts to privately order a dissolution
agreement. 3 5 No-fault rules, as well as other modem reforms that have
liberalized divorce laws, have made this kind of bargaining in the shadow
of law more integral to the nature of modem divorce. 36 H.L. Ross applied
its relevance in
the idea of law's shadow to torts, 3 7 Mirjan Damaska found
39
criminal law, 38 and Mark Galanter found it everywhere.
How might the shadow of law idea be useful in thinking through the
positive value of the current under-regulation of same-sex sexual activity?
Is there a way in which to imagine law's shadow as liberty-enhancing when
applied to the domain of extramatrimonial or nonmatrimonial affective or
sexual behavior? Given law's current disinclination to regulate same-sex
sex on terms similar to that of different-sex sex, one cannot say that the
shadow of law is invested with the bargaining endowments that law's
jurisdictional presence creates. Nor can we understand same-sex sex to take
place in a world similar to Robert C. Ellickson's Shasta County cattle
ranchers who, while technically regulated by law, ignore or are indeed
ignorant of the positive law that grants rights and responsibilities in
connection with cattle-related trespass and fencing costs. 40

Rather than

resolving disputes from the starting point of Mnookin/Kornhauser-ian
bargaining endowments created by positive law, Ellickson argued that
positive law was irrelevant to their dealings, preferring instead workaday
norms of neighborliness. 4 1 Ellickson's order without law works, by his
own admission, only in close-knit communities that are characterized by
necessary interdependence. Their mutual obligations and the availability of

Justice in Many Rooms:

Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 J. Legal

Pluralism 1,4-5 (1981).
34. Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 8.
35. Id. at 968.
36. Id. at 953-54.
37. H. Laurence Ross, Settled out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims
Adjustment (1980).
38. Mirjan Damaska, A Foreign Perspective on the American JudicialSystem, in State

Courts: A Blueprint for the Future 237 (T.J. Fetter ed., 1978).
39. Galanter, supra note 33, at 9.
40. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law:
Disputes (1991).
41. Id. at 123.

How Neighbors Settle
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informal sanctions to enforce them keep almost all residents within the
bounds of civility. The nonnormative sexual conduct in which I have an
interest may or may not take place within such a community, and to the
extent that there is a community involved, it is surely less likely to be closeknit in the ways that characterized Ellickson's cattle ranchers.
Notwithstanding the limitations of these accounts in helping us get better
purchase on the nature of the gap on which this essay is focused, it would
be premature to abandon the shadow of law concept altogether. The utility
of Mnookin and Kornhauser's model is limited in this context in part
because they were studying the bargaining patterns of those who sought exit
from the institution of marriage, whereas a significant part of the present
project-and of the Loving case-has to do with the implications of the
terms of entrance to the institution of marriage, for those who seek
admission and for those who do not. The marriage contract has always
been different from other civil contracts insofar as the state interjects itself
as an interested third party that can override the interests of either or both of
the other two parties. The exercise of the state's power means that, more
than in most other private contractual contexts, the state sets the terms of
capacity to enter into the contract as well as the substantive nature of the
agreement itself. Modem divorce reform has diminished the role of the
state in determining the conditions in which exit is legally possible, thus
enabling greater bargaining in the shadow of law as described by Mnookin
and Kornhauser. By contrast, the state has not disengaged itself to the same
degree in setting the terms and conditions of entrance into a marital
contract. Thus, while two parties of different races are permitted to marry
after Loving, it remains the case that one is not able as a matter of law to
contract to a nonmonogamous marriage, 42 a marriage between more than
two persons, 43 a marriage for a term, 44 a marriage in which sex is explicitly

42. Twenty states have laws criminalizing adultery. See Ala. Code § 13A-13-2 (2005);
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1408 (2001); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-6-501 (2007); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
798.01 (West 2007); Ga. Code Ann. § 16-6-19 (2007); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6601 (2004);
720 I11.Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/11-7 (West 2002); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-3507(1) (1995); Md.
Code Ann., Crim. Law § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2002); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.30
(West 2004); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.36 (West 2003); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-29-1 (West
1999); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 645:3 (2007); N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-20-09 (1997); Okla.
Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 871 (West 2002); R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-6-2 (2002); S.C. Code Ann. § 1615-60 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-103(1) (2003); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-365 (2004); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 61-8-3 (LexisNexis 2005).
43. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (affirming conviction for practicing
polygamy and rejecting the argument that a prohibition on polygamy violated the Free
Exercise Clause); State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1371
(2007) (holding that prohibition against polygamy did not violate defendant's First
Amendment right to free association). Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia have
statutes criminalizing polygamy. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 13A-13-1 (2005); Del. Code Ann. tit.
11, § 1001 (2007); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-701 (1995); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4301 (West
1983); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 206 (1998).
44. Sheils v. Sheils, 301 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1969); Shibi v. Shibi, 69 A.2d 831 (Conn.
1949); Wagner v. Wagner 59 Pa. D. & C. 90 (1947); Erickson v. Erickson, 48 N.Y.S.2d 588
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offered in exchange for financial support,4 5 or a marriage between two
46
persons of the same sex.
Given the ongoing strong investments of the state 47 in setting the terms
of entrance to the institution of marriage, bargaining in its shadow is
something one can do only in connection with divorce. The state does not
see itself as setting background rules or bargaining endowments which the
parties can choose whether or not to include in their marital vows. It is a
to
take it or leave it kind of thing that the state is making available
48
particular kinds of couples who meet the state's eligibility criteria.

(1944); Delfino v. Delfino, 35 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1942); Campbell v. Moore, 1 S.E.2d 784 (S.C.
1939). But see Osgood v. Moore 38 Pa. D. & C. 263 (1940).
45. See Roush v. Battin, 30 N.W.2d 453, 454 (Wis. 1947) (noting that "illicit

cohabitation" cannot be consideration for an agreement to marry); cf Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 190 (1981) (noting that any promise to "change some essential incident of the
marital relationship" is unenforceable).
46. The federal government and most states have statutes and/or constitutional
amendments defining marriage as between a man and a woman. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2000); Ala. Const. art. I, § 36.03; Ark. Const. amend. 83, § 1; Ga. Const. art. 1, § 4, I;
Haw. Const. art. 1, § 23; Idaho Const. art. 11, § 28; Ky. Const. § 233A; La. Const. art. 12, §
15; Mich. Const. art. I, § 25; Miss. Const. art. 14, § 263A; Mo. Const. art. I, § 33; Mont.
Const. art. XIII, § 7; Neb. Const. art. 1, § 29; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 21; N.D. Const. art. XI, §
28; Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11; Okla. Const. art. II, § 35; Or. Const. art. 15, § 5a; S.D. Const.
art. XXI, § 9; Tex. Const. art. 1, § 32; Utah Const. art. I, § 29; Va. Const. art. I, § 15-A; Wis.
Const. art. 13, § 13.
47. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888) ("[Marriage] is an institution, in the

maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress.");
State v. Heath, No. 2005AP2639-CR, 2006 WL 1817455, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. July 5, 2006)

("[M]arriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. Its stability
is basic to morality and civilization and of vital interest to society and the state .... ");
Vandervort v. Vandervort, 134 P.3d 892, 895 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) ("[T]he rights of the

plaintiff and defendant are not isolated from the general interest of society in preserving the
marriage relation as the foundation of the home and the state." (quoting Wooden v. Wooden,
239 P. 231, 233 (1925))).
48. Having said that, it is important to note that if you are able to meet the formal criteria
of marriage (a man, a woman, not rendered incapacitated by age or other disability, not
married to another person, and not of a specified degree of relation by blood) anyone can get
married, no matter how unwise that marriage may be. The clerk who issues marriage
licenses does nothing more than the bureaucratic task of assuring that the formal
requirements of marriage have been met by applicants. Divorce is another matter altogether.
Notwithstanding the no-fault revolution, it is much harder to get divorced than it is to get
married. To varying degrees and with varying intensity of effort, states and the federal
government spend substantial public resources on efforts to keep married couples married.
The 2006 reauthorization of the federal "welfare" law authorized $150 million to support
programs designed to help couples form and sustain healthy marriages. From these funds,
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Service's Office of Family Assistance has made
numerous grants to public and private organizations to set up programs for the purpose of
marriage education, marriage skills training, public advertising campaigns, high school
education on the value of marriage, and marriage mentoring programs. Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C.A. § 603(a)(2) (West Supp. 2007) ("Healthy marriage promotion and
responsible fatherhood grants"); U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Office of Family
Assistance, OFA Healthy Marriage and Promoting Responsible Fatherhood Initiatives,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/hmabstracts/summary.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008).
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What is worse, the normative investment that the state articulates in the
institution of marriage casts a shadow of a different kind than that described
by Mnookin and Kornhauser. In In the Shadow of Marriage: Single
Women and the Legal Construction of the Family and the State,49 Ariela
Dubler noted that the study of marriage law's normative significance in
organizing the family, gender, and sexuality is incomplete if we merely
focus our optic on those people who are married. She shows how never
married, not yet married, and widowed women existed in a social and legal
world that, despite its location outside the law, remained highly regulated
by the norms of marriage, the forms of social life, and commitment that it
valued. The regulation of these nonmarital lives shows how there is no
"outside of marriage," but rather social positions that are defined in terms of
their proximity to and stake in marriage itself. "[M]arriage continues to
regulate the terrain outside of its formal borders, preserving its legal and
ideological supremacy as a normative model for all intimate relations and as
an arbiter of which relationships deserve legal recognition and
protection." 50 Dubler concludes that "[s]ingle women... constitute the
sociopolitical terrain on which lawmakers craft their descriptive and
aspirational visions of marriage proper... and understanding the meaning
of marriage requires a still further foray, beyond
marriage's margins and
51
into the territory outside of its formal borders."
Just as "marriage's shadow," 52 according to Dubler, was materialized in
the nineteenth-century law of dower, common-law marriage, and heart balm
actions, today we still find marriage eclipsing the possibility of a viable
domain exterior to or untethered to the values and investments of marriage.
Closer to our own era, courts continue to enforce marriage-like agreements
even though they lie technically outside the legal requirements of
marriage, 53 so long as those agreements conform to the form and substance
49. Ariela R. Dubler, In the Shadow of Marriage: Single Women and the Legal
Construction of the Family and the State, 112 Yale L.J. 1641 (2003).
50. Id. at 1712.
51. Id. at 1644, 1646-47.
52. Id. at 1712.
53. These are circumstances in which heterosexual couples have represented themselves
as married although they have not obtained a marriage license, or were married by a person
not legally empowered to marry two people. See, e.g., Persad v. Balram, 724 N.Y.S.2d 560
(2001). Yet courts have been willing to annul marriages taken on by youthful exuberance on
the ground that there was no intent to undermine the institution of marriage. See, e.g., Davis
v. Davis, 175 A. 574 (Conn. 1934); Porter v. Cook, 31 Del. Co. 277 (C. P. Delaware 1932)
(involving two minors who married in a spirit of levity and not in sincerity and truth, where

the court, in equity, granted an annulment at the insistence of the girl's father, stating that to
constitute a valid marriage there must be an understanding and an appreciation of what the
ceremony is and what the legal consequences naturally arising therefrom are); Meredith v.
Shakespeare, 122 S.E. 520 (W. Va. 1924) (involving two infants who went through a
marriage ceremony in a spirit of jest growing out of the excitement and exuberance of a
party, but who never lived together, where the court granted an annulment on the ground that
even though an actually and legally performed marriage ceremony had taken place, the
parties had no intention of being bound thereby, or of assuming the duties, rights, privileges,
and obligations of such status).
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of marriage proper. Indeed, New York State officially recognizes those
marriages as fully valid, notwithstanding their technical infirmity. 54 On the
other hand, courts have been unwilling to enforce antenuptial or postnuptial
amend, or personalize the
agreements in which the parties sought to modify,
55
contractual commitments of legal marriage.
Dubler's work teaches us that marriage as currently defined and governed
by law, not only severely limits the scope of any bargaining that might take
place between parties who want to be and/or are married, but also seeks to
govern-and indeed does govern-the lives of those who lie outside the
pickets of marriage itself. In 2000, the American Law Institute (ALI)
adopted new principles relating to the formation and dissolution of
56
domestic partnerships, whether involving same- or different-sex couples.
The ALI Principles recommend that courts adopt a default rule recognizing
a domestic partnership if, among other things, two persons have maintained
a joint household for a cohabitation period, understood as two or three
years. 57 To escape the presumption in favor of a domestic partnership, a
couple must have made an enforceable contract to the contrary.5 8 Thus, the
law opts them into a marriage-like regime whether or not they reached a
mutual explicit agreement that they desired or intended to acquire this
status. The form of the relationship, not the parties' intent, is fundamental
here. If a relationship is found to be a domestic partnership, a wide range of
rules will be applied to the parties relating to the distribution of property
upon the termination of the relationship. 59 The intended effect of the ALI
Principles is to enlarge marriage law's shadow.
The ALl Principles illustrate the nub of the problem of the shadow of
marriage: those who fall within marriage's shadow find themselves locked
into a social field in which the attachments we take up have meaning
already determined by the state. As such, once in that field, one is denied
the power to determine or negotiate the meaning and implications of sexual
54. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 25 (McKinney 1999); see Estate of Harold H. Whitney, N.Y.
L.J., July 16, 2007, at 32 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. July 15, 2007) ("Although persons who intend to be
married in New York State must secure a marriage license from a town or city clerk in the
state, a failure to procure such a license will not render a duly solemnized marriage void.
[New York Domestic Relations Law] §25 directs, in pertinent part, that nothing contained in
that article shall be construed to render void, by reason of a failure to procure a marriage
license, any marriage solemnized between persons of full age." (citations omitted)); Cardozo
v. Holden-Cardozo, N.Y. L.J. 19, Apr. 19, 2004, at 19 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 19, 2004) (finding a
marriage valid although the marriage certificate was never filed with the town clerk as
required by law).
55. See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 310 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1973); Sheils v. Sheils, 301 N.Y.S.2d
372 (1969) (holding the terms of a separation agreement unenforceable where a man and
pregnant woman married for the purposes of legitimizing their future child and
simultaneously executed a separation agreement in which she waived all claims of support
and gave to him a power of attorney authorizing a "Mexican divorce").
56. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations § 6
(2000) ("Domestic Partners").
57. Id. § 6.03(2)-(4), § 6.03 cmt. d.
58. Id. § 6.03 cmt. b.
59. See id. §§ 6.04-.05.
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or emotional intimacy, cohabitation, monogamy, intermingling of finances,
the joint purchase of property, or the naming of the other party on one's
health or life insurance policy, for instance. Indeed, the ALl Principles
enumerate as one consideration relevant to the determination of whether the
relationship is one that will be governed by marriage-like law "the extent to
which the relationship wrought change in the life of either or both
60
parties."
These principles, largely applauded by the lesbian, gay, and progressive
legal communities, 6 1 though with some notable exceptions, 62 frustrate, if
not render impossible, the formation of economic, emotional, and sexual
attachments and intimacies that are not overdetermined by their similarity
to the architecture of marriage. The ALl Principles, together with existing
laws of marriage that grant or impose marital status on relationships that
look enough like marriage and/or share its values, threaten to darken and
lengthen the shadow that marriage law casts on the social worlds
technically outside of its jurisdiction. To borrow a term Janet Halley has
recently put to much use, all of us are conscripted into the cause of
"carrying a brief for" 63 marriage whether or not we so wish.

60. Id. § 6.03(7)(e). The full list of factors to be considered are
(a) the oral or written statements or promises made to one another, or
representations jointly made to third parties, regarding their relationship; (b) the
extent to which the parties intermingled their finances; (c) the extent to which their
relationship fostered the parties' economic interdependence, or the economic
dependence of one party upon the other; (d) the extent to which the parties
engaged in conduct and assumed specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance
of their life together; (e) the extent to which the relationship wrought change in the
life of either or both parties; (f) the extent to which the parties acknowledged
responsibilities to each other, as by naming the other the beneficiary of life
insurance or of a testamentary instrument, or as eligible to receive benefits under
an employee-benefit plan; (g) the extent to which the parties' relationship was
treated by the parties as qualitatively distinct from the relationship either party had
with any other person; (h) the emotional or physical intimacy of the parties'
relationship; (i) the parties' community reputation as a couple; (j) the parties'
participation in a commitment ceremony or registration as a domestic partnership;
(k) the parties' participation in a void or voidable marriage that, under applicable
law, does not give rise to the economic incidents of marriage; (1) the parties'
procreation of, adoption of, or joint assumption of parental functions toward a
child; [and] (in) the parties' maintenance of a common household.
Id.
61. See, e.g., Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different
Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1125 (1981); Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of
Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1265 (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The
ALl Domestic PartnerPrinciplesAre One Step in the Right Direction,2004 U. Chi. Legal F.
353.
62. See Elizabeth Scott, Domestic Partnerships,Implied Contracts, and Law Reform, in
Reconceiving the Family: Critique of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution 331 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
63. See Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism 17
(2006).
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The reach and insistence of marriage's shadow teach us how difficult it
will be to pull off the twin tasks of securing marriage rights for same-sex
couples while seeking to shrink or hem in the shadow that marriage casts
more structurally over those people who desire to have their sexual and
affective lives and attachments take place in a social terrain that they intend
to occupy ground outside of governance of marriage. Understood as such,
rather than enhancing liberty in ways understood by Mnookin and
Kornhauser, law's shadow threatens to regulate as much of social life as it
can plausibly extend its reach.

Returning to the law and society literature, Sally Falk Moore's notion of
a "semi-autonomous social field" may offer a model that helps adapt
Mnookin and Kornhauser's idea of "bargaining in the shadow of law" to the
social/sexual domain of which I am presently concerned. The semiautonomous social field is one that
can generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that ... is also
vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the
larger world by which it is surrounded. The semi-autonomous social field
has rule-making capacities, and the means to induce or coerce
compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which
at the invitation of persons
can, and does, affect and invade it, sometimes
64
inside it, sometimes at its own instance.
The semi-autonomous social field is not dependent upon close-knittedness
or the economic or social attachments of a particular insular social group:
but does not dominate it;
"The outside legal system penetrates the field
65
there is room for resistance and autonomy."
To illustrate the nature of the semi-autonomous social field, Moore offers
an example that may be useful here. The production of "better dresses" in
the garment industry in New York City, she reports, requires a unique
combination of formal collective bargaining between the workers and
management, and an informal system of gifts, favors, flattery, sexual
attention, and voluntary acts of friendship between management and
labor.66 The demand for "better dresses" is quite volatile, given the whims
of fashion and the change of seasons, thus producing swings between
periods of frenzied work and virtually no work at all. To respond to these
fluctuating demands and remain competitive, management and labor must
work flexibly and often in violation of the terms of the union contract. The
labor representatives, both within the shop and in the union, agree to this
flexibility and in return receive the many gifts and favors described above.
Moore interestingly points out that "[a]ll of these givings of gifts and
doings of favors are done in the form of voluntary acts of friendship, and
64. Moore, supra note 11, at 720.
65. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism,22 Law & Soc'y Rev. 869, 878 (1988).
66. Moore, supra note 11, at 726.
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the occasions when they are given are holidays such as Christmas or other
67
times when this would be in keeping with a relationship of friendship,"
such as birthdays, weddings, christenings, and anniversaries. Thus, the
relationship between management and labor is officially characterized by
all as one of friendship, in some cases even kinship or family, while at the
same time it is unofficially one that is structured by law and the terms of a
legally enforceable labor contract.
Moore's example of the "better dresses" industry's semi-autonomous
social field offers an interesting, and potentially productive, analytic for
thinking through the opportunity for norm generation in sexual and intimate
relationships that lie outside legal marriage, and that neither aspire to its
governance nor are involuntarily drawn into its normative precincts. These
actors are able to develop forms of attachment, express intimacies, and
renegotiate relationships that are otherwise well-defined by market and
labor law in ways that supplement and defy the legal rules that govern the
industrial workplace. What renders this site "semi-autonomous" from law
is the degree to which legal rules lurk in but do not overdetermine the
relationships within it. This model offers a conceptual framework with
which to imagine how we might loosen the grip of law's shadow. Is there a
way to understand the domain of intimacy and sexuality outside marriage as
something like the world of "better dresses"? Moore's work on the semiautonomous social field offers one way of imagining more flexibility in the
zones of social life found within the shadow of marriage law.
Yet I fear that the semi-autonomous social field, like Mnookin and
Kornhauser's work on the shadow of law and Merry's work on legal
pluralism, may not offer the tools that are needed to loosen the gravitational
pull of marriage for those who desire to set up camp outside its lot lines.
Moore is careful to note that the "favors" that both sides provide one
another are, of course, made possible as favors by virtue of the fact that they
are departures from what the law and the contract require or entitle them to
do. 68 Thus, law operates as a background condition that implicitly enables
the affective relationships to occupy the normative field as foreground. So
too, "[n]one of [the favors and promises of gifts] are legally enforceable
obligations. One could not take a man to court who did not produce them.
But there is no need for legal sanctions where there are such strong extra69
legal sanctions available."
For the most part, the legal rules embodied in labor law gain coercive
force by and through one party's election to enforce those rights. As
H.L.A. Hart put it in describing the aspects of law that fit poorly in Austin's
command theory of law, some laws "do not require persons to do things,
but may confer powers on them." 70 Power-conferring laws "appear then as

67. Id.
68. See id. at 728.

69. Id. at 726.
70. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 48 (1961).
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an additional element introduced by the law into social life over and above
that of coercive control." 7 1 Labor law, like the law of contracts and trusts
and wills, creates private power that has regulatory force only to the extent
that one or more of the private parties subject to the law chooses to exercise
the power the law enables either directly (by asserting a claim before a legal
authority) or indirectly (through the bargaining endowments the law as a
background norm creates).
In contrast to the role of labor law in the "better dresses" industry,
marriage law would be far more resistant to its demotion to background
norm. Like it or not, marriage remains a contract between two consenting
parties and the state. The law of marriage represents a hybrid of public and
private power that renders it quite different from those laws that merely
advantage or enable private action. As third party to the marriage contract,
the state will insist that its interests and values remain in the foreground of
the domain in which it asserts its jurisdiction. As we saw above, courts
have not tolerated creative or resistant efforts to renegotiate the form that
matrimonial contract takes.
While it is disappointing that the ideal of the semi-autonomous social
field proves less useful than at first suspected in mapping a domain of
greater normative flexibility in the domain of law's shadow, it offers no
help in thinking through how we might limit the reach of the legal shadow
and preserve a domain that resists the gravitational pull of marriage. Put
another way, we need something else to unsettle the power that marriage
possesses as the measure of all things that have elements of intimacy, love,
commitment, sex, or the like. Their viability, legibility, and even their
meaning are judged along a yardstick that measures their similarity or
dissimilarity to marriage.
Advocates on behalf of the cause of same-sex marriage have played a
role in reinforcing the benchmark status marriage enjoys. Their arguments
have rendered the viability of counterpublics that lie beyond the social field
of marriage all the more difficult to imagine. These arguments assert the
desire to fall within marriage law's shadow and seek to prove as close a
proximity to the ideal form of marriage as possible. In so doing, advocates
of same-sex marriage make it all the more difficult for others to renounce
the sentimentality of the couple, to pledge moral commitments that intend
something distinctly different from the rights and responsibilities of
normative kinship, and that not only refuse the familiar architecture of
marriage but refuse an architecture altogether. Michael Warner and Lauren
Berlant have defended the integrity and possibility of these social fields as
72
queer counterpublics.
It strikes me that there are two fronts on which the battle for marriage
rights should be fought, but at present only one of them is at all visible or
71. Id. at40.
72. See generally Warner, supra note 16; Lauren Berlant & Michael Warner, Sex in
Public, 24 Critical Inquiry 547 (1998).
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valued in the movement to secure rights for same-sex couples. The stakes
in this struggle are obvious for those who want into the institution of
marriage. But there remains a significant group of people, regardless of
sexual orientation, who want no part in marriage and find themselves swept
into its regulatory embrace despite the absence of an intent or desire to have
their sexual or affective lives governed by the law of matrimony or to be
brought within a particular normative frame of kinship. This is our
challenge: to argue for and accomplish same-sex marriage without
foreclosing the possibility of queer counterpublics. Put another way, how
can we keep Lawrence from turning into McLaughlin when we long for and
argue for "our" Loving?
Having explored the literature from several fields above and having
found them wanting in accomplishing this project, one further option
suggests itself as offering a viable approach with which to make some
headway. Striving to carve out a zone of liberty that resides at sufficient
distance from marriage to repel or evade its normative pull leaves marriage
at the center of the universe. Everything starts looking quite different,
however, if we interpose a different central case around which all forms of
human connection orbit. This kind of move aims to displace marriage as
the measure of all things by interposing a competing and normatively
disorienting gravitational pull that could result in the disorganizing of
bodies, intimacy, sexuality, and publics in interesting and productive ways.
Instead of surrendering to a normative landscape that seeks to establish
the conventional meaning of relationships by virtue of their similarities or
dissimilarities to a marriage (are they two people, one male, one female,
who are sexually monogamous, cohabitate, have commingled their financial
resources, are raising children together, etc.), we might rezone the whole
affair by interposing a different form of attachment as the benchmark.
Several possibilities are worth pursuing, such as the bonds of siblings, the
norms governing relationships between parents and children, stepparents
and stepchildren, or even the social conventions that surround the giving
and receiving of gifts. 73 In the end, I urge that we focus on the concept of
friendship which, among its many virtues, occupies a social space largely
unregulated by law.
73. The works of Marcel Mauss and Claude Levi-Strauss on the gift and its role in the
construction of not only the social but of gender have been formative in a number of
important feminist and queer projects. See, e.g., Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary
Structures of Kinship (Rodney Needham ed., James Harle Bell & John Richard von Sturmen
trans., Beacon Press 1969) (1967); Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of
Exchange in Archaic Societies (1967); Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the
"PoliticalEconomy" of Sex, in Toward an Anthropology of Women 157, 171-83 (Rayna R.
Reiter ed., 1975).
One colleague suggested using the norms that surround the relationship between a person
and her pet(s). Given the ease with which the likes of Senator Rick Santorum have conjured
up a slippery slope that ends in sex with animals were the courts to recognize a right to
same-sex marriage, see Excerpt from Santorum Interview, USA Today, Apr. 23, 2003,
I feel
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-04-23-santorum-excerpt_x.htm,
obligated to resist using this as a new benchmark for present purposes.
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So this is the thought experiment: rather than assessing the relative
virtues of a relationship by dint of its similarity or dissimilarity to marriage,
what if we did so by dint of its formal or family resemblance to friendship?
As Peter Goodrich has noted, the rules, the norms, and the social field of
friendship are developed beyond the scope and even interest of law.
Friendship is "quite literally the unthought of law." 74 It is "the antonym or
obverse of the relationships that legal practice enacts." 75 Some of the
recent scholarship urging the legal regulation of friendship strikes me as
radically wrongheaded. 76 Unfortunately, this work indulges the misplaced
view that, if something important is at stake, law should regulate it. Other
attempts to77 engage the relationship of friendship to law are more
thoughtful.
From this vantage point, the range of acts, pledges, commitments,
loyalties, and desires that make up our sexual and affective lives are
amenable to more promiscuous meanings. When friends choose to live
together, sharing a new level of domestic intimacy, we do not know in
advance what commitments and responsibilities that intimacy necessarily
entails. Friendship can, but need not, entail reciprocal commitments, can be
casual or intimate, long-term or short-lived, and can be playful or quite
profound. Or it can be all these things. It takes quite a thick set of acts and
intentions to drag the conduct of friends out of its autonomous social field
into the jurisdiction of law. That is part of what we prize about friendship,
indeed why its fictive form in the "better dresses" industry does so much
work.
The promiscuous economies of attachment that characterize
friendship are not rule based, subject to due process, or-god forbidsubject to the demands of justice that we associate with law. Friendship, in
contrast to marriage, resists the status of status that marriage enjoys. For all
these, and no doubt other reasons, friendship exerts no gravitational pull of
the sort we see with marriage, and as such, is unable to cast a shadow in the
Mnookin/Kornhauser-ian sense.
Thus, there are structural reasons why we might want to substitute
friendship for marriage as the benchmark that grounds our reasoning about
"Freedom to marry," argued from a
sexual and affective liberty.
perspective that accepts the normative centrality of marriage, imagines
"freedom" very differently than it does when we make the argument from a
place that privileges the centrality of friendship. The former is hopelessly
entangled in the logics and values of marriage, while the latter renders
legible a domain of not-marriage that has positive and multiple possibilities.
The current most prominent arguments in favor of same-sex marriage
conceptualize the notion of marital freedom in terms that pay no mind to the
problem of "compared to what?" They do not see it as their project to

74. Peter Goodrich, Laws of Friendship, 15 L. & Literature 23, 28 (2003).
75. Id.

76. See Ethan J. Leib, Friendship& the Law, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 631 (2007).
77. Laura A. Rosenbury, Friendswith Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189 (2007).
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imagine a social life outside of marriage, yet the kind of sentimentality that
underwrites their claims renders that social life less viable.
The turn to friendship can do more. It offers a way to destabilize the
meanings and the makings of meaning of fundamental human life. For
instance, elsewhere I have questioned how feminist legal theory can
account for "the domain of sexuality that is the surplus above mere
procreation, for it may be that its greatest value lies precisely in its
excess." 78 To understand nonreproductive sex as a kind of excess already
accepts a paradigm that figures sex's primary purpose as reproductive. To
the extent that marriage continues to be valued as the proper and best social
and legal structure for the bearing and raising of children, we have very
hard, if not impossible, work to do to rescue nonreproductive sex from its
liminality. Knowing this, same-sex marriage advocates carefully pick their
plaintiffs in ways that embrace the values of the repro-normative domestic,
preferring nice-looking couples with children who, like "regular" people,
take their kids to little league and school plays. These ways of casting the
homosexual family have perversely, though not intentionally, played a role
in recent court decisions that have denied homosexual couples the right to
marry on the ground that the structure of marriage is necessary only for
heterosexual people because their sex practices can result in "accidental
pregnancies." 79 In these decisions and the arguments that the same-sex
couples' lawyers are making, nonreproductive sex recedes further and
further from view.
At the same time, the turn to friendship gives us another way to think
about the meaning of reproductive sexuality as well. When inside the law
or the shadow of marriage, the normative ideal of the family requires
certain attachments, certain expectations, and certain subject positions that,
if not present, produce profound forms of melancholia and longing.
Consider the woman who chooses to get pregnant with a male friend, a
male stranger, or someone who lies in the complex domain between the
two. This person is not intended to be, nor expects to be, a father in the
traditional social sense. Yet it is inevitable that the child of such a
reproductive sexual act will suffer melancholic longing for the phantom
father whose significance to the child is overdetermined by his absence.
Breaking loose from the architecture of marriage and the hetero-normative
domestic that it entails renders it more possible to imagine and then
construct other forms of attachment that are not always already a betrayal or
disappointment of marriage's demands and the expectations they engender.
Interrupting marriage's preemptory normalization of the social field by
substituting friendship in its place opens up a range of possible conceptions
of the meaning of reproductive sex-between friends, between strangers, in
78. Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 181, 187 (2001).
79. See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Hernandez v. Robles,

855 N.E.2d 1, 7 (N.Y. 2006) ("Heterosexual intercourse has a natural tendency to lead to the
birth of children; homosexual intercourse does not.").
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fact, all reproductive sex. Escaping the social field of marriage enables new
forms of commitment, responsibility, love, care, and relatedness other than
those of idealized "mother" and "father."
When we think about sex from the vantage point of friendship, excess
gets located in very different wards. Friendship, unlike marriage, does not
have an official role for sex-reproductive or otherwise. Some see sex
between friends as a benign event, others fear it as a threat to the friendship,
while still others think that the absence of a sexual component is precisely
what distinguishes a friendship from other kinds of attachment, loosely
called "lovers." But surely there is no consensus on this issue, nor is there a
common sense that a consensus is a desirable thing to achieve. We are
content to let each person hold his or her own views on the matter, and most
likely are not offended if a person's views are somewhat in flux on the
matter. That is the beauty of the social field of friendship. Thus, the
domain of excess that lies at the limit of what sex is "supposed to be about,"
in this context, is in some fundamental way incomprehensible.

The implications of this paradigm shift should affect the drafting of
something like the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution. As
presently written, they create a default presumption that opts into the
governance of marriage law those couples whose actions manifest a family
resemblance to marriage. What motivates this presumption is the view and
the value that certain types of adult relationships have a teleology, "first
comes love, then comes marriage. . ." and accepts, indeed encourages the
pull of marriage. A countercommitment to the viability of lifeworlds well
outside the wards of marriage would reverse the presumption, requiring
those who seek the bargaining endowments of marriage law to expressly
and mutually indicate a desire to be so governed. I recognize that shifting
this presumption comes at a cost, but after much deliberation, it is a cost I
urge us to pay. There remain other ways to address the problem of
structural inequality in intimate relationships that do not so effectively
extinguish the viability of sexual and affective life outside marriage.
I confess that friendship does not get me everything I hoped for in a
paradigm shift that is designed to displace the normative priority and draw
of marriage. Yet it does significant work in the service of launching that
very important and necessary project. As Abraham Lincoln once remarked,
"I hope to have God on my side, but I must have Kentucky." 80 The turn to
friendship may be a necessary move, but may not be all we hope for in a
project of this sort.
Friendship proves a disappointment as the central case in this context
when we consider the possibility of what Michael Warner, among others,

80. Rev. M. D. Conway on His Late Visit to Washington, Crisis (Columbus, Ohio), Feb.
12, 1862, at 24.
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seeks to valorize: stranger sociability. Warner imagines a domain of
counterpublics that, at least in some cases, are constituted by relations
among strangers.
In modem society, a stranger is not as marvelously exotic as the
wandering outsider would have been to an ancient, medieval, or earlymodem town. In that earlier social order, or in contemporary analogues, a
stranger is mysterious, a disturbing presence requiring resolution....
Publics orient us to strangers in a different way. They are no longer
merely people whom one does not yet know; rather, an environment of
stranger-hood
is the necessary premise of some of our most prized ways
81
of being.
Warner's stance with respect to strangers allows us to open up
counterpublics in which sex, intimacy, and other forms of attachment can
be forged with someone understood to be a stranger. Certain forms of
queer sex come to mind as easily identifiable examples of this idea-the
erotic encounters to be found among strangers in bars, airport bathrooms, or
bookstores are what he has in mind. 82 But so does the ecstasy shared by
and among strangers at, for instance, one of Barack Obama's rallies, or the
kinds of attachment that form among various sorts of online communities or
shared readers of a text. For the turn to friendship to do the robust work
that I intend in this project, the conception of friendship must be understood
in a way that does not figure the stranger as its opposite. To that end, the
notion of friendship cannot be allowed to reduce to a form of kinship-lite.
The full elaboration of this part of the project awaits my work on another
day, but the articulation of these concerns points out the direction that work
must take.

I must add one last observation about the longing for Loving that
motivates so much of present day arguments for marriage equality. Often
advocates and lawyers lead with the argument that legal marriage would
afford "our" relationships legitimacy and dignity. This argument must be
abandoned and radically critiqued. That critique should form the bedrock
of this movement if we are to make something of the liberty right secured in
Lawrence as setting out the conditions precedent for the formation of queer
counterpublics.
The mere fact that some members of our community suffer an affective
injury when they are denied the option to marry does not mean that that
pain should coagulate into a right and be argued as such. Take for instance
the movement to desegregate public transportation in the South. When
Rosa Parks refused to get off that bus, she was among a group of women in
Montgomery who felt that the treatment they received at the hands of public
81. Warner, supra note 16, at 75.
82. Chapter Five of Publics and Counterpublics, which he coauthored with Lauren
Berlant, elaborates on this idea. See id. at 187-208.
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bus drivers was discourteous. 83 I am sure it felt that way. But the right that
was ultimately articulated as the motivating force behind the Montgomery
bus boycott and the actions that followed thereafter were not ones that were
exhausted by a demand that black women be treated with courtesy, but
rather much more: that racial segregation was an expression of white
supremacy.
The translation of the experience of segregation as an affront to courtesy
into one that sought to undermine the structural subordination of black
people to white should inspire similar hard thinking in today's same-sex
marriage movement. The dignity argument in these cases is premised upon
an acknowledgment of marriage's normative superiority and legitimacy of
its command. The argument based in dignity risks transforming Lawrence
into McLaughlin, thereby eroding the liberty interests articulated in
Lawrence and setting back the struggle for a promiscuous form of sexual
liberty that can be elaborated alongside the efforts to open up the institution
of marriage to same-sex couples. The simultaneous projects of marriage
equality and of enabling lifeworlds that are not structured by the
architecture of marriage, or by any architecture at all for that matter, are
impossible so long as we cling to and indulge a longing for Loving.

83. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the
Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 Yale L.J. 999, 1003 (1989) ("[T]hey primarily demanded
courtesy and formal even-handedness, taking for granted the continued existence of racial
separation.").

